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UNPRECEDENTED INFRINGEMENT:
DEBUNKING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DNA
COLLECTION FROM MERE ARRESTEES IN
LIGHT OF MARYLAND V. KING
CHRISTEN GIANNAROS1
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario: David, a drug dealer, meets Victor
through some friends at a party. As their friendship grows, David, who
Victor does not know is a drug dealer, asks Victor to hold a package for a
few weeks. Victor accepts, unaware that the package contains five pounds
of cocaine. As it turns out, detectives have been surveilling David for
months, and upon approaching him, offer to not prosecute him if he
provides the detectives with his drug source. David, taking advantage of the
detective’s appealing offer, implicates Victor, telling the detectives where
and how much cocaine Victor has. After procuring a search warrant, the
detectives arrest Victor, bring him to the station house, and take a sample
of his DNA via cheek swab. Victor’s DNA is processed in a nation-wide
DNA database that runs DNA taken from arrestees and convicts against a
database that contains samples from perpetrators who have left their DNA
behind at crime scenes, hoping to find a match.
Victor’s DNA, however, is never matched to an unknown sample. Later,
the charges against Victor are dismissed for lack of evidence, but Victor’s
DNA is still in the database until he affirmatively takes action to remove it.
Even then, the government will retain a copy of Victor’s sample
indefinitely.
This hypothetical illustrates the less glamorous side of DNA collection
1 J.D., 2015, St. John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Queens College, City University of
New York.
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statutes. Usually, the use of DNA in capturing a criminal is hailed as an
incredible advent of technology, but consideration is rarely given to the
constitutional implications that these glorious triumphs carry with them.
For example, in Maryland v. King,2 a man arrested on assault charges had
his DNA collected pursuant to state law.3 After his DNA was processed, he
was linked to an unsolved 2003 rape case, and subsequently prosecuted.4
The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, upheld the validity of
DNA collection from mere arrestees because it served the legitimate
governmental interest of accurately identifying an arrestee as the person he
claims to be.5 Scalia’s scathing dissent, however, argued that this
“identification” use is instead a pretext for an impermissible use of the
Fourth Amendment—”[to search] a person for evidence of a crime when
there is no basis for believing the person is guilty of the crime.”6 Scalia was
referring to the Fourth Amendment’s protection of an individual’s privacy
by requiring that law enforcement have “probable cause” before initiating a
search against any person.7 He argued that when an arrestee—a person who
has not yet been convicted of a crime—has his DNA collected and
searched against a system of “unsolved” crimes, law enforcement officials
lack probable cause to link that individual to any of the crimes that his
DNA is being searched against.
The Maryland8 and federal9 DNA collection statutes upheld in King
result in serious Fourth Amendment deprivations, the most significant of
these being the violation of the general prohibition against searches without
probable cause. Accordingly, this Comment proposes a series of legislative
changes that would protect a person’s Fourth Amendment rights, but still
allow for the existence of arrestee DNA collection statutes. Under these
changes, an arrestee’s DNA is searched only against DNA in which there
exists probable cause to run a search. This revision to the current statutory
scheme would preserve both the government’s and the arrestee’s interests
substantially.
Part II of this Comment summarizes the science behind DNA use, the
inner workings of the government’s Combined DNA Index System
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
Id. at 1966.
Id.
Id. at 1970.
Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (LexisNexis 2012).
DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (2006).
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(CODIS), and current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part III explores
the rationale behind the majority and dissenting opinions in King, while
Part IV engages in a critical analysis of it, mainly attacking the majority’s
conclusion that arrestees maintain a diminished expectation of privacy that
justifies the warrantless searches of their DNA. Part V considers the
unrecognized consequences of the Court’s decision, while Part VI offers a
series of legislative remedies that bring the arrestee DNA collection
statutes in compliance with the Constitution.
II. BACKGROUND: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN DNA, CODIS, AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
DNA contains information specific to each person, allowing forensic
scientists to match DNA samples by creating links of this specific
information between the sample and its origin.10 Because this unique
identifying feature of DNA can help law enforcement identify criminals,
the federal government created the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
to store DNA information.11 CODIS, however, raises serious Fourth
Amendment concerns.
A. Biology 101 - A Beginner’s Guide To DNA
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is present in every nucleus-containing cell
in the human body.12 Shaped like a double helix, this molecule contains the
genetic makeup of each individual.13 DNA molecules are located in the
nucleus of each cell and are formed in strands.14 The sides of each strand
are connected by “bases,” which form ladder-like steps within the
strands.15 There are four types of bases: A (adenine), C (cytosine), G
(guanine), and T (thymine).16 In forming the ladder steps, the bases connect
in a very specific manner—A always pairs with T, and C always pairs with

10 John D. Biancamano, Arresting DNA: The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection Statutes and
Their Fourth Amendment Justifications, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 619, 623-24 (2009).
11 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(b) (2006).
12 Lisa R. Kreeger & Danielle M. Weiss, Forensic DNA Fundamentals for the Prosecutor: Be Not
Afraid, American Prosecutors Research Institute, 4 (Nov. 2003), http://www.crime-sceneinvestigator.net/APRI-DNAfundamentalsprosecutor.pdf
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
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G.17 The areas on the chromosome in which the base pairs repeat are called
“loci”.18 It is the precise order in which these bases connect that create an
individual’s DNA sequence, and the differences in DNA sequences give
each individual their unique identity.19 Fascinatingly, no two individuals
share the same DNA sequence.20
Because crime scene evidence is often in the form of blood, hair, or
saliva, it is no wonder that the DNA present in such biological evidence is
extremely helpful in the criminal justice context. Forensic scientists collect
DNA and create a “suspect profile,” analyzing the unique order in which
the base pairs connect.21 In practice, forensic scientists use short tandem
repeat (STR) testing as a method to compare the repeated base pair
sequences to loci on other chromosomes.22 The likelihood that two
individuals share the same number of STRs at all the various loci tested is
almost impossible, thus ensuring that DNA profiles remain distinct.23 Once
a profile is analyzed, it is stored in a DNA database for future access.24
Future collections of DNA evidence from either individuals in police
custody or from crime scenes are compared against the suspect profiles in
the database, and prosecution may begin against an individual if a match is
found.
Despite the seemingly comprehensive knowledge that scientists have
about DNA, DNA largely remains a mystery—over 98 percent of DNA
performs an unknown function.25
B. Creation of a Profile in CODIS
In enacting the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Congress authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to
collect DNA from both convicted felony offenders and crime scenes where
DNA was left behind.26 The FBI used this grant of authority to create
17
18
19
20
21
22

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. Identical twins are the only exception to this rule.
Id. at 6.
D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
455, 461 (2001).
23 Id.
24 Irina Sivachenko, DNA as the Twenty-First Century Fingerprint: Approval of DNA Collection
Upon Arrest in United States v. Mitchell, 53 B.C. L. REV. E-Supplement 249, 252 (2012).
25 Jaan Suurkula, Junk DNA, PSRAST.ORG, http://www.psrast.org/junkdna.htm (last visited Jan. 8
2014).
26 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2012) (“The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may establish
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CODIS, a combined effort by local, state, and federal governments to join
their DNA databases in order to grant seamless access to law enforcement
officials.27 In response to privacy concerns, only “junk” DNA—the portion
of DNA that contains information pertaining to the identity of the
individual, but no other physical or medical characteristics—is analyzed.28
CODIS is expansive; all 50 states mandate the collection of DNA from
certain convicted felons.29 Courts have upheld the practice of collecting
and maintaining DNA samples and profiles from convicted felons.30
Recently, however, controversy over whether DNA collection applies to
mere arrestees has surfaced—mostly because arrestees are not yet
convicted of a crime and may ultimately be acquitted or found not guilty.
Arrestee-collection statutes were first pioneered by the states,31 with the
federal government quickly following suit with the DNA Fingerprint Act of
2005, expressly authorizing the collection of DNA from arrestees.32 The
Act contains certain safeguards: disclosure of DNA is limited to criminal
justice agencies for identification purposes, legal proceedings, and research

an index of . . . DNA identification records of persons convicted of crimes . . . [and] analyses of DNA
samples recovered from crime scenes”).
27 See H.R. Rep. No. 106-900 (I), at 8 (2000) (noting that “CODIS allows State and local forensics
laboratories to exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically in an attempt to link evidence from
crime scenes for which there are no suspects to DNA samples of convicted offenders on file in the
system); see also Kaye, supra note 12 at 462.
28 See H.R. Rep. No. 106-900(I), at 27. Because of the sensitive information that DNA contains,
only junk DNA is analyzed when creating a CODIS profile:
[T]he genetic markers used for forensic DNA testing were purposely selected because they are not
associated with any known physical or medical characteristics, providing further assurance against
the use of convicted offender DNA profiles for purposes other than law enforcement identification
. . . [T]hey show only the configuration of DNA at selected “junk sites” which do not control or
influence the expression of any trait. DNA records in the national database contain the following
information only: an agency identifier for the agencies submitting the DNA profile; the specimen
identification number; the DNA profile; and the name of the DNA personnel associated with the
DNA analysis. [CODIS DNA profiles] do not reveal information relating to any medical condition
or other trait. By design, the effect of the system is to provide a kind of genetic fingerprint, which
uniquely identifies an individual, but does not provide a basis for determining or inferring anything
else about the person.
29 See CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometricanalysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Jan. 10, 2014); see also Michelle Hibbert, DNA
Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 767, 775 (1999).
30 See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 1638 (2005); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996).
31 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:609(A)(1) (2005) (“A person who is arrested for a felony . .
. shall have a DNA sample drawn or taken at the same time he is fingerprinted”); VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-310.2:1 (2004) (“Every person arrested for the commission or attempted commission of a violent
felony . . . shall have a sample of his saliva or tissue taken for DNA analysis”).
32 DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) (2006) (“The Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation may establish an index of DNA identification records of . . . persons convicted
of crimes, persons who have been charged in an indictment or information with a crime”).
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and development.33 The Act also places a criminal penalty of imprisonment
of up to one 1 year or a fine of no more than $250,000 for anyone who
“knowingly discloses a sample or result . . . in any manner to any person
not authorized to receive it, or obtains or uses, without authorization, such
sample or result.”34
To remove one’s DNA information from CODIS, an individual must go
through the process enumerated in the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act.35 A DNA profile may be expunged from CODIS if two
conditions are met. First, a DNA profile may be expunged if a conviction
is overturned, a charge is dismissed, or if an individual is arrested but not
charged.36 Second, a final court order must be submitted establishing
such.37 Effectively, the burden is placed on the individual to expunge the
information. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act,
however, only explains how to expunge DNA profiles, not DNA samples.38
A DNA sample is a bodily sample from an individual on which DNA
analysis can be performed.39 Conversely, a DNA analysis (or profile) is the
actual analysis of a bodily sample.40 Congress has peculiarly remained
silent on the issue of expungement for the actual DNA sample, leading
scholars to believe that the government indefinitely retains DNA samples.41
In sum, when a DNA sample is collected from an arrestee, that sample is
run against unknown DNA samples in CODIS. If a match is found,
proceedings against the arrestee may begin for that crime linked to the
matched DNA sample. The Fourth Amendment is offended, however, each
time such a search is run, because law enforcement (a) have no warrant or
33 Id. at § 14132(b)(3) (noting that stored DNA samples and analyses are only disclosed to
“criminal justice agencies for law enforcement identification purposes; in judicial proceedings; . . . for
criminal defense purposes . . . or if personally identifiable information is removed, for a population
statistics database, [or] for identification research”).
34 42 U.S.C. § 14135e(c) (2004).
35 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1). The expungement process requires that the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation expunge the DNA analysis of a person who submits a “certified copy of a final
court order establishing that [the] conviction has been overturned[.]” The Director must also expunge
the DNA analysis of anyone who is arrested and charged, upon submitting a “certified copy of a final
court order establishing that [the] charge has been dismissed or has resulted in an acquittal or that no
charge was filed within the applicable time period.”
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Stephanie Beaugh, How the DNA Act Violates the Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy of Mere
Arrestees and Pre-Trial Detainees, 59 LOY. L. REV. 157, 165 (2013).
40 Id.
41 See id. at 170; see also Jason Tarricone, “An Ordinary Citizen Just Like Everyone Else”: The
Indefinite Retention of Former Offenders’ DNA, 2 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 209, 221
(2005).
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probable cause to search the arrestee’s DNA, and (b) have no probable
cause to link the arrestee to the crime linked to the now-matched DNA
sample.
C. An Overview of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment affords to the people the “right to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”42 For an individual to invoke this amendment’s protection, she
must first establish that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in that
which she is seeking to protect against search or seizure.43 To establish
this, an individual must have (1) a subjective expectation of privacy and (2)
an expectation of privacy that society deems reasonable.44 Once this
expectation of privacy is established, law enforcement may only search a
person or place upon the issuance of a warrant based on probable cause.45
Although strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment’s requirements is
almost always required, the Court has loosened these requirements in very
limited circumstances.46
One such exception is the “special needs” test.47 This test renders the
probable cause and warrant requirement unnecessary in situations where
“special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable.”48 In other words,
courts do not apply this exception if the policy in question is geared
towards solving or detecting crimes, because solving or detecting crimes is
not “beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”49 Accordingly, the
Court has applied this exception in cases where the search is conducted for
reasons other than promoting normal law enforcement goals, such as

42 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
43 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
44 Id.; cf. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that there is no reasonable

expectation in one’s trash placed outside for public collection).
45 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
46 See Beaugh, supra note 39, at 175-92; see also Tarricone, supra note 41, at 217-21.
47 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
48 Id.
49 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1981 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)).
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maintaining drunk-driver free roads,50 public safety on railroads,51 school
discipline,52 and effective workplaces.53 Because the very nature of this
exception is to serve the public interest, no individualized suspicion is
necessary in searching an individual pursuant to this test.54
Courts have created a second exception for certain groups of people with
the “totality of the circumstances” test.55 This test is used when a court
must determine if, in executing a warrantless search, police officers had
probable cause to believe that a person committed a crime.56 In
determining whether a search was reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances, a court balances the government’s interests against an
individual’s expectation of privacy.57 Often, an individual’s expectation of
privacy depends on his or her legal status.58 Accordingly, courts have held
that prisoners,59 probationers,60 and parolees61 have diminished privacy
rights and are therefore subject to warrantless searches that are
“reasonable.”62 The rationale behind this position is that once in state
custody, the government has a legitimate interest in a convict or prisoner’s
50 See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (upholding the
constitutionality of police sobriety check points because states have a substantial governmental interest
in preventing drunk driving).
51 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633 (1989) (upholding random drug testing on railroad employees
because they are engaged in “safety-sensitive tasks”).
52 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (upholding random drug testing of
student athletes by public schools because schools have an interest in preventing student drug use).
53 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987) (upholding work-related searches of public
employees because they are incident to employment).
54 See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665.
55 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 414 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that collection of
defendant’s DNA was reasonable when the court balanced the scope of sensitive information stored in
DNA with the government’s interest in collecting information to aid law enforcement); see also United
States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that the collection of a probationer’s
DNA was justified under the totality of the circumstances when the court balanced the intrusion of the
blood test with the fact that the defendant was a convicted felon).
56 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
57 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
58 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985) (stating that “Although the underlying
command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures must be reasonable, what is
reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place”); see also United States v.
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 834-35 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1638 (2005) (holding
that “parolees have demonstrated by their adjudicated criminal conduct a capacity and willingness to
commit crimes serious enough to deprive them of liberty”).
59 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S 517 (1984) (holding that prisoner who was searched by prison
guards did not suffer Fourth Amendment violation because “privacy” is incompatible with prison
security).
60 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of warrantless
searches of probationer’s home by probation officer because he remained in the custody of the state).
61 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (upholding random search of parolee by parole
officer because parolee was still in custody of the state until his sentence was completed).
62 See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1992).
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identity.63 For example, this interest stems from law enforcement’s need to
ascertain who an individual is in the event that a prisoner or convict alters
his appearance.
In contrast to the special needs exception, the totality of the
circumstances test generally requires some degree of individualized
suspicion. Often, the fact that an individual is in the state’s custody is
grounds for such suspicion because that individual’s expectation of privacy
is diminished.64 Just like the special needs exception, however, a search
analyzed using the totality of the circumstances test (and any search in
general) may never be for the purpose of ordinary-crime solving.65 As the
next section explains, however, this very premise was violated in Maryland
v. King.
III. THE SEMINAL CASE: EXPLORING THE RATIONALE BEHIND MARYLAND
V. KING
In 2009, Alonzo King was arrested for menacing a group of people with
a shotgun.66 Incident to his arrest, and pursuant to Maryland law,67 police
officers took a sample of King’s DNA by placing a cotton swab to the
inside of his cheeks.68 Once King’s DNA was collected, processed, and
analyzed, it was revealed that King’s DNA matched the DNA sample
recovered at an unsolved 2003 rape case.69 A search warrant was issued
and King was subsequently prosecuted for the 2003 rape case.70 King
moved to suppress the DNA match, arguing that the Maryland statute
authorizing such DNA collection violated his Fourth Amendment right

63 See, e.g., Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1196–97 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059
(1990) (holding blood testing of prisoners constitutional in light of government’s interest in controlling
AIDS in prison).
64 See Samson, 547 U.S. at 849-50; see also Charles J. Nerko, Assessing Fourth Amendment
Challenges to DNA Extraction Statutes After Samson v. California, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 926-937
(2008).
65 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1982 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). When a search is
incident to an arrest, the search “either serves other ends (such as officer safety, in a search for
weapons) or is not suspicionless (as when there is reason to believe the arrestee possesses evidence
relevant to the crime of arrest).
66 Id. at 1965.
67 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (LexisNexis 2012) (“[A] DNA sample shall be collected
from an individual who is charged with a crime of violence or an attempt to commit a crime of
violence”).
68 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1965.
69 Id. at 1966.
70 Id.
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against unreasonable searches and seizures.71 The Supreme Court granted a
writ of certiorari to address the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment
prohibits the collection and analysis of DNA samples from mere arrestees
that have not yet been convicted.72
Justices Kennedy, Roberts, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito held that the
procedure was constitutional. The Court applied the “totality of the
circumstances” test, balancing the interests of the government against an
arrestee’s expectation of privacy. In doing so, it found that the
government’s legitimate interest in accurately identifying an arrestee
outweighed the expectation of privacy of an arrestee.
In beginning its inquiry, the Court noted that a cheek swab for an
arrestee’s DNA constitutes a search.73 The Court then proceeded to analyze
the reasonableness of the search by identifying the legitimate governmental
interests served by the Maryland DNA Collection Act. The Court stated
that “the legitimate government interest . . . is one that is well established:
the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process
and identify the persons and possessions they must take into custody.”74
The Court’s opinion examined (1) the state’s interest in accurately
identifying arrestees in its custody, (2) the state’s interest in doing so
safely, and (3) the state’s interest in properly processing an arrestee.
The first and most emphasized interest the Court recognized was the
need for law enforcement officers to be able to accurately identify persons
in its custody.75 According to the majority, the search of King’s person was
incident to his legal arrest and thus was valid.76 The search of his person,
which yielded his DNA, was purportedly further justified by the fact that
the government has an interest in an arrestee’s identity, which “goes
beyond ensuring that the proper name is typed on the indictment.”77
Collection of an arrestee’s DNA is critical in determining a suspect’s
criminal history, which in turn helps law enforcement identify an arrestee,
the Court opined.78 The Court reasoned that this quest to determine past
criminal history is indistinguishable from comparing a suspect’s booking
photograph to a sketch artist’s drawing of a perpetrator, except for the fact
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1969.
Id. at 1970.
Id. at 1971.
Id. at 1970-71.
Id. at 1971.
Id.

GIANNAROS MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

DNA COLLECTION OF MERE ARRESTEES

6/23/2016 1:19 PM

465

that DNA is more accurate.79 The Court mentioned that fingerprints and
DNA are both forms of identification that perform the same function.80
The Court moved on to examine the second recognized state interest:
ensuring that the custody of an arrestee does not pose a risk to staff or other
detainees.81 DNA identification is useful in this context because it can help
law enforcement evaluate the risk an arrestee poses, such as a past history
of violence or mental disorder.82 This is particularly helpful, the Court
reasoned, because an arrestee’s name lacks the ability to furnish such
elaborate information.83
The Court then recognized the third state interest in “ensuring that
persons accused of crimes are available for trials.”84 In possessing an
arrestee’s DNA, law enforcement can more accurately gauge an
individual’s likelihood of fleeing the instant charges, if, for example, the
instant charge is less severe than the uncharged crime an arrestee’s DNA
information links him to.85 This is also relevant to a fourth consideration
the Court probed: whether or not an individual should be released on bail.86
An arrestee’s “future dangerousness” can impact a judge’s decision about
whether an individual should be released on bail and how much bail should
be set.87
Next the Court further examined the similarities between DNA
identification and fingerprinting.88 Citing Judge Hand, the Court reiterated
the belief that fingerprinting was a widely accepted and thus unchallenged
procedure,89 indicating that DNA identification will attain the same status
once it ceases to be so novel.90
To end its inquiry and complete the balancing test, the Court examined

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 1971-1972.
Id. at 1972.
Id.
Id. (citing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004)).
Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1972.
Id. at 1964 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979)).
Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1973.
Id.
Id. at 1973-1974.
Id. at 1976.
Id. (citing United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1932)).
The first noted instance of fingerprinting in a criminal case dates back to 1892 in Buenos Aires,
Argentina. MARK R. HAWTHORNE, FINGERPRINTS: ANALYSIS AND UNDERSTANDING 9 (CRC Press et
al. eds., 2009). In contrast, the first use of arrestee DNA was in Louisiana after it passed a law
authorizing such use in 1997. DNA Sample Collection From Arrestees, NIJ.GOV,
http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/collection-from-arrestees.htm (last visited Oct. 21,
2013).
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the other side of the equation: the arrestee’s expectation of privacy.
Because “the expectations of privacy of an individual taken into police
custody ‘necessarily [are] of a diminished scope,’”91 an arrestee’s person
and possessions are subject to “extensive exploration,”92 and arrestees may
even have to lift their genitals or cough in a squatted position.93 The Court
placed further focus on the nonintrusive nature of the search, holding that
the “gentle rub” of a cotton swab contains no risks of danger to the
arrestee.94
Next, the Court looked to whether the processing of King’s DNA sample
intruded his expectation of privacy. The Court first noted that the CODIS
loci came from junk DNA, which does not reveal any sensitive genetic
information.95 By stating that junk DNA in its current understanding does
not have the capability to reveal such information, the Court sidestepped
the issue as to whether junk DNA can reveal sensitive information
sometime in the future.96 Alternatively, the Court determined that even if
genetic information can be retrieved from junk DNA, it is not tested for
that purpose.97 Instead, the Court stated that law enforcement officials use a
DNA sample to generate only a unique serial number that correlates to the
sample so that future samples can be matched to it.98 Specifically, a House
Report explains that “DNA records in the national database contain the
following information only: an agency identifier for the agencies
submitting the DNA profile; the specimen identification number; the DNA
profile; and the name of the DNA personnel associated with the DNA
analysis.”99
Lastly, the Court considered the safeguards within the Maryland Act to
conclude that the state’s legitimate interests supersede King’s expectation
of privacy. The Act forbids the collection of DNA information that
pertains to information other than the identification of the individual.100
Therefore, since the act forbids any other use of an arrestee’s DNA, the
91 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1978 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979)).
92 Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)).
93 See id. (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Ctny. Of Burlington, 132 S. Ct.

1510, 1520 (2012)).
94 Id. at 1979.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1979.
98 Id.
99 H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1 at 27 (2000).
100 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (quoting MD. PUB. SAFETY CODE ANN. § 2-512(c)) (effective Jan.
1, 2009).
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majority found that the search of his DNA did not intrude on King’s
expectation of privacy.
In a scathing dissent, which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan
joined, Justice Scalia argued that the majority’s finding that “identification”
was Maryland’s legitimate interest was really a pretext for solving
unsolved crimes, a “noble” but impermissible interest under Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.101 The dissent framed its analysis under the
general principle that the Fourth Amendment “forbids searching a person
for evidence of a crime when there is no basis for believing the person is
guilty of the crime or is in possession of incriminating evidence. That
prohibition is categorical and without exception; it lies at the very heart of
the Fourth Amendment.”102 The dissent then began to pick apart the
majority’s rationale by reiterating the circumstances when applying the
“special needs” and “totality of the circumstances” tests are appropriate.
When no individualized suspicion to search an individual exists, the special
needs test applies only when the search is done for reasons other than
ordinary crime solving.103 On the other hand, when individualized
suspicion is present, the totality of the circumstances test applies only when
a governmental purpose other than crime solving is at issue.104 The dissent
ultimately undermined the one proposition that the majority’s totality of the
circumstances test relied on: that the principal purpose of the DNA search
was something other than detecting criminal wrongdoing.105
Justice Scalia first noted that a search incident to an arrest may only be
executed to yield either weapons or evidence that the individual may
destroy, or evidence that is relevant to the crime of arrest.106 In searching
an arrestee for his DNA, none of these objectives are satisfied.107 Scalia
argued that by recognizing this, the majority attempted to emphasize the
fact that the search had a goal of “identifying” King. 108 As mentioned
earlier, the majority stated that an arrestee’s past criminal history (which
running an arrestee’s DNA against the CODIS database would reveal,

101 See Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 1980.
103 Id. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47 for an illustration of case law applying the special

needs test.
104 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1982.
105 Id.
106 Id. (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343-44 (2009); Thorton v. United States, 541 U.S.
615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
107 Id..
108 Id.
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assuming there is a match found) is relevant to determine his “identity.”109
The majority justified this conclusion by rattling off a list of government
interests in an arrestee’s identity: it can inform law enforcement of the
violent past/tendencies of an individual and ensure that the arrestee is
appropriately handled if he presents a risk to staff and other detainees,110
can determine the likelihood that an arrestee will return for trial in light of
knowledge of his past crimes,111 and can help inform a judge if and when
an arrestee should be released on bail once due consideration is given to the
arrestee’s past record.112 But the majority seemed to establish an arrestee’s
identity by identifying what unsolved crimes the arrestee has committed,
the dissent pointed out.113 In turn, this becomes “indistinguishable from the
ordinary law-enforcement aims that have never been thought to justify a
suspicionless search.”114
Scalia then argued that confirming King’s identity could not have been
so urgently crucial to determine the risks of danger he posed to society, as
the majority held, in light of the fact that Maryland law enforcement took
three days to begin testing King’s DNA.115 Because Maryland law
mandated this three-day waiting period before DNA could be tested,116 the
dissent suggested that Maryland lawmakers did not enact the law with the
majority’s purpose of “identification” in mind.117 The dissent similarly
undermined the majority’s conclusion that King’s identification was crucial
to the judge’s decision to set bail. The fact that Maryland law prohibited
DNA testing until King was arraigned was at odds with the majority’s
ascribed purpose, since bail is often set during arraignment, and in
Maryland’s case, without the qualifying “identification information” the
DNA sample apparently would provide.118 Scalia further illustrated this
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1972.
Id.
Id. at 1972-73.
Id. at 1973.
Id. at 1983 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1983
Id.
Id.; MD. PUB. SAF. CODE ANN. § 2-504(d)(1) (2011). § 2-504(d)(1) states that:
A DNA sample collected from an individual charged with a crime under subsection (a)(3) of this
section may not be tested or placed in the statewide DNA data base system prior to the first
scheduled arraignment date unless requested or consented to by the individual as provided in
paragraph (3) of this subsection.
117 Id. For example, MD. PUB. SAF. CODE ANN. § 2-512(c)-(e) goes as far as imposing a
punishment of up to five years’ imprisonment to anyone who tests an individual’s DNA information in
anyway except as provided in the statute.
118 Id. at 1984.
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point by noting the length of time it took the Maryland State Police
Forensic Science Division to test King’s sample: his sample was seized on
April 10, 2009, was received by the forensic unit on April 23, 2009, and
was mailed to a lab for testing on June 25, 2009 – almost three months
from the date of King’s arrest.119 The lab results were finally made
available on July 13, 2009, and on August 4, 2009, it was revealed that
King’s sample yielded a match to the 2003 unsolved rape case.120
Still, Scalia opined that King could not have been “identified” by this
match.121 Scalia noted that CODIS is categorized by two distinct
collections.122 The first collection, which Scalia named the “Convict and
Arrestee Collection,” contains DNA samples taken from known convicts
and arrestees.123 He named the second collection the “Unsolved Crimes
Collection,” which consists of unknown samples taken from crime
scenes.124 The “Convict and Arrestee Collection” does not contain any
information that could identify who the sample was taken from, such as a
name, for example.125 This collection instead contains only the “DNA
information itself, the name of the agency that submitted it, the laboratory
personnel who analyzed it, and an identification number for the
specimen.”126 The only reason CODIS does not allow any identifying
information for a given specimen is because “the submitting state
laboratories are expected already to know the identities of the convicts and
arrestees from whom samples are taken,”127 Scalia reasoned. Furthermore,
the majority’s “identification” purpose is not achieved when considering
CODIS’s central function: checking the samples contained in the
“Unsolved Crimes Collection” against the samples in the “Convict and
Arrestee Collection.”128 If identification was the state’s actual purpose,
119
120
121
122

Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1984.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing FBI, CODIS, and NDIS Fact Sheet, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited October 2, 2015)).
123 Id.
124 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1984 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125 Id.; See also H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1, at 27 (2000) (stating that “DNA records in the
national database contain the following information only: an agency identifier for the agencies
submitting the DNA profile; the specimen identification number; the DNA profile; and the name of the
DNA personnel associated with the DNA analysis”).
126 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1984 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127 Id. Other methods of “identifying” King include taking and checking his fingerprints, and
documenting his name, sex, race, height, weight, date of birth, and address. Id. at 1985. Also, Scalia
suggested that if the DNA testing were aimed at “identifying” King, then the lab results would have
returned actual results of his identification.
128 Id. at 1984.
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then it would check King’s DNA sample against the “Convict and Arrestee
Collection” in order to search whether King was already in the system.129 If
King was in the system, then a match would appear, and law enforcement
would be able to conclusively determine that Alfonso King was really who
he claimed to be.
The only thing that was “identified” was the previously taken DNA
sample from the 2003 crime scene.130 Scalia argued that King’s identity
was already known; the police had taken his full name, race, sex, height,
weight, date of birth, and address.131 Just as no one would say that an
arrestee is “identified” when he matches the description of a man on a
“wanted” poster, no one would say that the matched DNA sample
“identified” King.132 Instead, the man in the “wanted” poster is identified,
and in King’s case, it is the previously unidentified perpetrator in the 2003
rape case that is identified.133
Scalia then criticized the majority for failing to consider the actual text
of the Maryland Act, which would presumably shed light on Maryland’s
intended “purpose” in collecting arrestee DNA.134 Proceeding to analyze
what the majority ignored, the dissent noted that “identification” was not
among the Act’s intended purposes. Section 2-505(a)(2) of the Act135 states
that DNA samples are tested “as a part of an official investigation into a
crime,” or as Scalia put it, for ordinary law-enforcement purposes.136 The
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id.
Id.
Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1984 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(a) states that DNA samples shall be collected and

tested:
(1) to analyze and type the genetic markers contained in or derived from the DNA samples;
(2) as part of an official investigation into a crime;
(3) to help identify human remains;
(4) to help identify missing individuals; and
(5) for research and administrative purposes, including:
(i) development of a population data base after personal identifying information is removed;
(ii) support of identification research and protocol development of forensic DNA analysis
methods; and
(iii) quality control.
136 Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1984 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia illustrated this point further by
providing a comment from the Governor of Maryland. He commented that he was glad the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to hear the case because “[a]llowing law enforcement to collect DNA samples .
. . is absolutely critical to our efforts to continue driving down crime,” and “bolsters our efforts to
resolve open investigations and bring them to a resolution.” Id. (citing Marbella, Supreme Court Will
Review Md. DNA Law, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 10, 2012, at 1, 14).
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Act mentions using a DNA sample for identification, but only for the
purposes of identifying human remains137 and to help identify missing
individuals.138
In its final remarks, the dissent addressed the majority’s analogy between
fingerprints and DNA.139 The majority’s analogy was improperly drawn,
Scalia argued, because fingerprints are used to actually identify an arrestee,
while DNA is used to solve crimes.140 Furthermore, the FBI’s Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) contains the
identifying information that the DNA profile lacks, including criminal
history, mug shots, and physical markers like tattoos, scars, height, weight,
and eye color.141 The fingerprint system is more than adequate to address
the government’s “identity” concerns; all that DNA adds is the promising
benefits of solving crimes.142 In sum, Scalia questioned the authenticity of
the majority’s conclusion that law enforcement retains a substantial interest
in an arrestee’s DNA for identification purposes, especially when the
Maryland statute did not include “identification” as a purpose, and when a
fingerprint system already exists to meet these concerns.
IV. UNDERMINING THE MAJORITY’S RATIONALE
As the dissent pointed out, the majority in King made some obvious
errors. First, by failing to consider the text of the Maryland statute itself,
the Court did not recognize that “identification” was never the legislature’s
purpose. Additionally, many of the majority’s points are at odds with the
actual statute—or example, the fact that Maryland mandated a three-day
waiting period before testing a DNA sample is at odds with the majority’s
belief that urgent identification was necessary to identify any violent
tendencies or risks King could pose.143 The Court also made a hasty
determination in holding that arrestees have a diminished expectation of
privacy. The dissent avoided rebutting this portion of the majority’s
holding, but, as I explain below, the majority’s reasoning in reaching that
conclusion is flawed.
137
138
139
140
141

Id. at 1986 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(a)(3)).
Id. (citing § 2-505(a)(4)).
Id. at 1987 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Maryland, 133 S. Ct. at 1987. Fingerprints recovered from crimes scenes are not compared
against a database of known fingerprints.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1983 (2013).
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A. An Arrestee’s Privacy Interests are Superior to the Government’s
Interests
An arrestee can find himself in three situations: (1) he can be arrested,
charged, and convicted; (2) he can be arrested and charged but not
convicted; or (3) he can be arrested, not charged, and released. In the last
two situations, the arrestee is never convicted of a crime. The collection of
an arrestee’s DNA is impermissible because arrestee’s maintain an
expectation of privacy that surpasses that of a parolee, probationer, or
convict. This is because of the appreciable differences between an arrestee,
parolee, probationer, and convict: the arrestee is the only individual in this
group who has not been convicted of a crime—the very reason why
parolees, probationers, and convicts have a diminished expectation of
privacy. Because arrestees maintain an expectation of privacy, a search of
the arrestee’s DNA would not be justified without a warrant or probable
cause.
The majority, in applying the totality of the circumstances test, found
that an arrestee may have his DNA searched and placed in CODIS because
his legal status as an arrestee diminishes his expectations of privacy.144
This rationale is flawed. True, an arrestee does not enjoy the expansive
expectation of privacy that a non-arrested individual enjoys (since he is in
police custody). But an arrestee maintains a higher expectation of privacy
than a parolee, probationer, or convict. These individuals have a
substantially diminished expectation of privacy and are thus subject to
warrantless searches because they have been convicted of a crime.145 “A
conviction causes a permanent change in the convicted person’s status,
because the status changes from an ordinary citizen to a ‘lawfully
adjudicated criminal[ ] whose proven conduct substantially heightens the
government’s interest in monitoring’ him and ‘quite properly carries lasting
consequences.’”146 An arrestee, in contrast, has yet to be convicted (and
even charged in some jurisdictions)147 and is presumed innocent until
proven guilty. The rationale behind upholding warrantless searches against
probationers, parolees, and convicts does not extend to arrestees
144 Id. at 1978 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S 520, 557, 99 S. Ct. 1861).
145 See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S 517 (1984); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880

(1987); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848-49 (2006).
146 Beaugh, supra note 39, at 197 (citing United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 836 (9th Cir.
2004) (en banc) (plurality opinion)).
147 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL. CODE § 296.1 (a)(1)(A) (2012) (collecting DNA “immediately following
arrest”).
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whatsoever, since the charges against them may even be dismissed!
Because an arrestee retains an expectation of privacy greater than a
convict, parolee, or probationer, a search of an arrestee’s DNA would not
be justified without a warrant or probable cause. Accordingly, the
governmental interests that the majority in King belabored would not
outweigh King’s expectation of privacy. The government’s interest in
identification is a pretext for searching for evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing, as the dissent illustrated, and such an interest is not
constitutionally permissible to justify general searches.
B. Fingerprints Differ Vastly From DNA
The majority’s reasoning does not only suffer from its inability to
distinguish arrestees from convicts, parolees, and probationers, but also
from its ill-placed emphasis on the likeness between DNA and fingerprints.
The Court peculiarly forgot to address the extremely sensitive information
present in DNA, instead, it focused on the minimal invasiveness of the
search. DNA information can be used to run familial searches,148 and
although federal law provides for “safeguards,”149 there is no oversight
body ensuring that such private information will not be misused.
The use of “junk DNA” is also potentially problematic. Although the
government claims that junk DNA is used to ensure anonymity of the
donor,150 some scholars allege that junk DNA may actually contain
valuable genetic material.151
Furthermore, and most importantly, fingerprints, unlike DNA, are not
used to solve crimes. Instead, fingerprints are taken at arrest, to actually
“identify” individuals by running a taken fingerprint through a database of
known fingerprints, unlike what CODIS does.152
The sensitive information present in DNA is enormous, and the field of
148 See infra Part V.B.
149 42 U.S.C. § 14135e(c) (2012). The Act contains certain safeguards: it imposes a criminal

penalty of imprisonment of up to 1 year or a fine of no more than $250,000 to anyone who “knowingly
discloses a sample or result . . . in any manner to any person not authorized to receive it, or obtains or
uses, without authorization, such sample or result.” Id. It also limits disclosure of DNA information to
criminal justice agencies for identification purposes, legal proceedings, and research and development.
Id. at § 14132(b)(3).
150 See DNA ANALYSIS BACKLOG ELIMINATION ACT OF 2000, H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(I), at 27
(2000).
151 See, e.g., JOHN M. BUTLER, Forensic DNA Typing: Biology, Technology, and Genetics of STR
Markers. 17-22 (2d ed. 2005) (Stating what we once referred to as “junk DNA” may later be found to
contain valuable genetic information).
152 See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1987 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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science has yet to even fully understand its inner workings to an extensive
degree. Notwithstanding this lack of knowledge, sensitive DNA
information is used without regard to the future discoveries to be made
about the mysterious DNA molecule. If junk DNA is found to contain
sensitive material in the future, for example, then the government’s alleged
safeguard of using non-identifying information is pointless. Using junk
DNA when the possibility that it could contain sensitive information,
especially while an existing system already functions efficiently to identify,
is beyond comprehension.
V. IGNORING THE TEMPTATION TO SUPPORT A POWERFUL CRIMEFIGHTING TOOL: RECOGNIZING THE REAL WORLD CONSEQUENCES OF THE
KING DECISION
The King decision carries with it serious implications for all citizens:
law-abiding or not. An array of individuals may unfortunately face the
consequences of the Court’s decision to uphold the DNA collection from
mere arrestees, including individuals who are falsely accused, mistakenly
identified, acquitted, innocent, nonviolent, or ultimately not prosecuted.
Even those who are correctly arrested under probable cause face the
devastating consequences of DNA collection that the King decision fails to
acknowledge. First, if one wishes to remove his information from CODIS,
the burden is on the individual. Even after these efforts, only an
individual’s DNA profile is removed, not the actual DNA sample. Second,
DNA can be used to facilitate familial searches—a search of a DNA
sample’s family members, which has its own Fourth Amendment
implications.
A. Expungement of DNA in CODIS153
At the federal level, expungement of a DNA profile may only occur if an
arrestee obtains a final court order stating that the charges against her have
been dismissed.154 The burden of expungement is on the arrestee; she must
expend her efforts and go before the legal system to obtain a court order
finalizing the disposition of the charges brought against her.
If an arrestee refuses to submit a DNA sample, she is charged with a
153 This section focuses on expungement at the federal level, since the federal scheme applies to all
arrestees wishing to expunge their information from CODIS, regardless of which state they are arrested
in.
154 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1) (2006).
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class A misdemeanor.155 Even worse, if an arrestee who is wrongly
identified refuses to submit a DNA sample because of her non-involvement
in the crime of arrest, she will still face a federal offense after her
exoneration, because she failed to submit a DNA sample.
Perhaps the most alarming feature of the federal government’s DNA
statute is that after expungement, the government may retain an
individual’s DNA sample indefinitely.156 Proponents of CODIS will
quickly counter that like DNA, the government indefinitely retains
fingerprints without any public objection. The indefinite retention of DNA,
however, raises different concerns in light of the possible discoveries about
junk DNA usefulness.157
Yet another concern is the undeniable possibility of government abuse of
retained DNA samples. If the government has an ulterior motive in keeping
an individual’s DNA, such as investigating his involvement in another
crime, it might delay the submission of the final court order,158 or create a
new profile from the retained DNA sample in order to investigate the
individual.
Granting the government unlimited access to DNA through its ability to
indefinitely retain samples from the profiles entered in CODIS is a bold
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of privacy, especially since
the government retains no interest in a DNA sample once an arrestee
proves that the charges against him were never filed or were dropped.
B. DNA Can be Used to Facilitate Familial Searches
Because DNA contains sensitive genetic information, it can be used to
perform familial searches. A familial search is a partial search in which law
enforcement, who cannot match a recovered DNA sample from a crime
scene to the CODIS database, search the database for someone who might
be related to the recovered sample.159 If a familial relationship between the
known individual in CODIS and the unknown sample is shown, law
enforcement can find and investigate the known individual and his family
in efforts to find the true perpetrator.160 This has serious privacy
155
156
157
158
159

42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(5)(A) (2006).
See Tarricone, supra note 41, at 221.
See supra Part IV.B.
See Beaugh, supra note 39, at 199.
See Jeffery Rose, Genetic Surveillance
http://www.tinyurl.com/rosencodis.
160 Id.

for

All?,

SLATE

(Mar.

17,

2009)
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implications. Firstly, it subjects purely innocent individuals to harassment
and investigation by law enforcement. Secondly, African Americans are
more likely to be the subject of this harassment, since they represent about
40 percent of people convicted of felonies each year.161 One study showed
that “17 percent of African American citizens could be identified through
familial searches, as opposed to only 4 percent of the Caucasian
population.”162 Lastly, probable cause to search CODIS for a match is
absent.
Proponents of DNA searching argue that CODIS only analyzes junk
DNA, the part of a DNA strand that does not contain any genetic
information. But these proponents fail to give full credit to the everdeveloping field of science; many scholars assert that junk DNA has the
potential to indeed reveal sensitive information.163
Proponents also claim that familial searching is not a real criticism of
DNA collection because it is not a procedure that the FBI authorizes.164
But this neglects the fact that as of 2011, California, Texas, Colorado, and
Virginia all perform familial searching.165
Although familial searching can be useful, it presents serious privacy
concerns. Existing DNA profiles being searched for a relationship with an
unknown DNA sample have not given law enforcement probable cause to
search their DNA profiles, and if a link is found, they are subject to the
harassing techniques of law enforcement officers who seek information. A
2008 study noted that 84 percent of Americans thought that laws
prohibiting law enforcement from gaining access to genetic research
information are important,166 indicating society’s consensus that law
enforcement should not be granted unfettered access to genetic
information.

161
162
163
164

Id.
Id.
See BUTLER, supra note 151.
See SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELI, DNA DATA BANKS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS,
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 76-81 (2d ed. 2012).
165 Familial
Searching,
FBI.GOV,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometricanalysis/codis/familial-searching (last visited Jan. 9, 2014).
166 David J. Kaufman et al., Public Opinion about the Importance of Privacy in Biobank Research,
85
Am.
J.
Human
Genetics
643,
649
(Nov.
13,
2009),
available
at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2775831.
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VI. PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE FEDERAL ARRESTEE DNA COLLECTION
STATUTE
As an obvious start, Congress can amend the DNA Fingerprint Act of
2005 by reverting to the pre-arrestee version of the statute, where only
those convicted of a felony were subject to DNA collection.167
Alternatively, I present some possibilities that all serve to protect the
government’s interest in “identification” while maintaining an arrestees
privacy rights.
One possible legislative solution is to limit the collection of arrestee
DNA to individuals who have been convicted. Law enforcement would
still be free to pursue a warrant based upon probable cause to collect and
process the DNA before conviction if it deemed it necessary, as it normally
does. But this differs from the pre-arrestee version of the statute because
the warrant would permit the testing of an individual’s DNA against
unknown DNA only if there exists probable cause to link the individual to
the sample (which is linked to the crime the arrestee is suspected of being
involved in) instead of allowing an endless search through all unidentified
DNA samples. If a warrant is issued, but the arrestee is nonetheless found
innocent at trial or has the charges against him dropped, the government
would have the burden of expunging the profile. Although critics may
argue that the already burdened system would be disadvantaged by such a
policy, it is only fair that the government bear the costs of a policy it
wishes to implement.168 Lastly, Congress could specifically provide for the
immediate and permanent destruction of all DNA samples, adopting a
measure where the government would notify an arrestee and his attorney
that the sample has been destroyed, and assigning an oversight body to
ensure these procedures are followed.
If “identification” really is the motivating goal behind CODIS, then this
proposal would maintain the government’s interest in identifying an
individual. Fingerprints would operate in the meantime to ascertain that an
individual is who he claims to be, because, as illustrated in the facts of
King, identifying an arrestee is not an urgent concern, considering the fact
that King’s DNA was used to identify him days after his arrest. If the

167 See
Sarah
B.
Berson,
Debating
DNA
Collection,
NIJ.GOV,
http://www.nij.gov/journals/264/pages/debating-DNA.aspx (Oct. 29, 2009); 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a
(West 2005).
168 See Beaugh supra note 39, at 194 (comparing placing the burden of expungement on the
government to tort and contract theory, where the party who causes the injury must bear the cost).
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arrestee is convicted, law enforcement is free to use his DNA in the
database to find matches as it currently does, because at that point, it is
established that the individual’s expectation of privacy is substantially
diminished.
Finally, Congress could keep the arrestee DNA collection statute as is,
but in order to ensure that CODIS is only used for “identification”
purposes, and to make it as closely analogous to fingerprinting as possible,
Congress could enact legislation that expressly prohibits matching the
known arrestee DNA profiles against the unknown DNA samples. If used
solely for the purpose of taking an arrestee’s DNA sample to ensure that an
individual is who he claims to be, it will be akin to fingerprinting and will
finally achieve the “identification” purpose the statute currently lacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current arrestee DNA collection statute violates longstanding
notions of privacy, probable cause, and the presumption of innocence. The
Court’s decision in Maryland v. King fails to recognize that identification
of an arrestee is not the primary function of DNA identification laws.
It is irrefutable that the fields of science and technology are advancing at
unprecedented rates. These advancements often have serious privacy
implications, and in an effort to uphold the worthy guarantees of the
Constitution, the judicial and legislative branches must be cognizant of
them. DNA has the potential to be a powerful crime-fighting agent, but the
Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures,
combined with the serious risks associated with granting unfettered access
to sensitive genetic information, trump this potential. Therefore, a proposal
allowing for law enforcement to search an arrestee’s DNA only against
DNA profiles in which there exists probable cause will not only ensure that
the extent to which this sensitive information is exposed is limited, but also
that the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees against unreasonable searches and
seizures are vigilantly guarded.

